In a sample of 398 firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, firm-level differences in variables related to corporate governance had a strong impact on firm performance during the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 to 1998. Significantly better stock price performance is associated with firms that had indicators of higher disclosure quality (ADRs and auditors from Big Six accounting firms), with firms that had higher outside ownership concentration, and with firms that were focused rather than diversified. The results suggest that individual firms have some power to preclude expropriation of minority shareholders if legal protection is inadequate.
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Introduction
Weak corporate governance has frequently been cited as one of the causes of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 to 1998.
1 While weak corporate governance may not have triggered the East Asian crisis, the corporate governance practices in East Asia could have made countries more vulnerable to a financial crisis and could have exacerbated the crisis once it began. Recent research highlights the importance of corporate governance in emerging markets.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV 1997 (LLSV , 1998 (LLSV , 1999 (LLSV , 2000 demonstrate that, across countries, corporate governance is an important factor in financial market development and firm value. Regarding the East Asian crisis, Johnson, Boone, Breach, and
Friedman (JBBF 2000) show that country-specific measures of corporate governance perform better than standard macroeconomic variables at explaining the extent of currency depreciation and stock market decline of emerging markets during the crisis.
If corporate governance was a significant factor in the crisis, then corporate governance should explain not just cross-country differences in performance during the crisis, but also crossfirm differences in performance within countries. This paper uses firm-level data from the five East Asian crisis economies of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand to study the impact of corporate governance on firm performance during the crisis. Because the measures of legal protection emphasized in LLSV (1997, 1998, 1999) and JBBF (2000) are country-specific, I examine other aspects of corporate governance that vary at the firm level. I
show that the three aspects I examine, disclosure quality, ownership structure, and corporate diversification, all had a significant impact on the stock price performance of firms during the crisis. Because the crisis was, by all accounts, an unexpected event, it presents an interesting 1 Stiglitz (1998) , Harvey and Roper (1999), and Greenspan (1999) provide examples of this theory.
2 opportunity to study the proximate effect of corporate governance on firm performance during a period of extreme distress.
Corporate governance is the means by which minority shareholders are protected from expropriation by managers or controlling shareholders. Corporate governance could become more critical in a financial crisis for two reasons. First, expropriation of minority shareholders could become more severe during a crisis. JBBF (2000) argue that a crisis can lead to greater expropriation because managers are led to expropriate more as the expected return on investment falls. Second, a crisis could force investors to recognize and take account of weaknesses in corporate governance that existed all along. Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that investors ignored weaknesses of East Asian firms while the region was doing well economically, but quickly pulled out once the crisis began because they believed the region lacked adequate institutional protection for their investments. For both of these reasons, firms with weaker corporate governance could have lost relatively more value during the crisis.
Anecdotal evidence from the East Asian crisis suggests that expropriation of minority shareholders was prevalent. One example occurred in November 1997 when United Engineers Malaysia (UEM) acquired 32.6% of its financially troubled parent, Renong. UEM minority shareholders interpreted this as a bailout of Renong at an inflated price, and UEM's stock price fell 38% the day the transaction was announced (Straits Times 11/19/97, p. 62) . Another example comes from Korea where minority shareholders of Samsung Electronics protested that the firm had been providing debt guarantees to less-successful Samsung group companies and that these guarantees often were not disclosed (The Economist 3/27/99, p. 68). JBBF (2000) document other instances of expropriation of minority shareholders during the crisis, and
Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) describe different forms that expropriation can take. This paper considers whether the presence of firm-level characteristics 3 related to corporate governance can help prevent such instances of expropriation and, in turn, preserve firm value during a crisis.
The first firm-level characteristic presented here, disclosure quality, is an important element of corporate governance. LLSV (1998) argue that accounting standards play a critical role in corporate governance by informing investors and by making contracts more verifiable.
While LLSV (1998) and JBBF (2000) employ country-specific measures of accounting standards, I propose two firm-specific ways in which disclosure quality can be measured. First, a firm may have higher disclosure quality if it has a listed American depository receipt (ADR).
This higher disclosure quality can emerge formally, through mandated disclosure requirements of the listing exchange (for level II and III ADRs), or informally, through a larger pool of investors spurring increased demand for disclosure and increased scrutiny of the firm's reports (see Coffee, 1999) . Reese and Weisbach (2001) argue that increased protection of minority shareholders is a primary motivation for non-U.S. firms to cross-list in the U.S. (see also Stulz, 1999) .
Second, a firm may have higher disclosure quality if its auditor is one of the Big Six international accounting firms. 2 Previous research (e.g. Reed, Trombley, and Dhaliwal, 2000; Titman and Trueman, 1986) has associated Big Six auditors (or Big Eight auditors, for earlier years) with higher audit quality. The Big Six firms may be more likely to ensure transparency and eliminate mistakes in a firm's financial statements because they have a greater reputation to uphold (Michaely and Shaw, 1995) , because they may be more independent than local firms, or because they face greater legal liability for making errors (Dye, 1993) . Additionally, even in cases in which actual disclosure quality is not higher, Big Six auditors may offer higher 2 Six major accounting firms remained at the outset of the crisis as the Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand merger did not occur until late 1997.
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perceived disclosure quality and allay investors' fears because of their prominent, recognizable names (see Rahman, 1998).
These proxies for higher disclosure quality are associated with significantly better stock price performance during the crisis period (July 1997 to August 1998). Regression analysis shows that having an ADR is associated with a higher return of 10.8% over the crisis period and having a Big Six auditor is associated with an additional higher return of 8.1% over the crisis period (after controlling for size, leverage, country, and industry). While alternative interpretations (discussed later) are possible, this finding is consistent with the view that higher disclosure quality benefits minority shareholders by increasing transparency and mitigating expropriation during a period of distress.
The second aspect of corporate governance studied here is ownership structure. I first consider levels of ownership concentration. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that ownership concentration is, along with legal protection, one of two key determinants of corporate governance. Large shareholders can benefit minority shareholders because they have the power and incentive to prevent expropriation. On the other hand, large shareholders can themselves engage in expropriation. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) find high degrees of ownership concentration in firms from countries with relatively poor shareholder protection and argue that the conflict between large shareholders and minority shareholders is the primary corporate governance problem in such countries. Morck, Strangeland, and Yeung (2000) and Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000) discuss how controlling shareholders may pursue objectives that are at odds with those of minority shareholders.
Consistent with the view that large shareholders can prevent expropriation, higher ownership concentration is associated with significantly better stock price performance during the crisis. Regressions show a higher return of 2.6%, on average, for every increase of 10% in 5 the ownership of the largest shareholder (after controlling for size, leverage, country, and industry). This result suggests that the crisis amplified the pre-crisis valuation premium for emerging market firms with large blockholders reported by Lins (2000) . Still, large shareholders could be more likely to pursue objectives that are inconsistent with those of minority shareholders if they are involved with management of the firm or if their voting rights exceed their cash flow rights (Claessens et al., 2000) . I find that the return premium associated with higher ownership concentration is largely attributable to large blockholders that are not involved with management. Also, firms in which the largest shareholders' voting rights exceed their cash flow rights and firms with pyramidal ownership structures have significantly lower returns, although the significance disappears after controlling for other factors.
The third aspect, corporate diversification, is not a corporate governance mechanism per se, but previous research has suggested that agency problems are different within diversified firms. The lower transparency of diversified firms in emerging markets results in a higher level of asymmetric information that may allow managers or controlling shareholders to more easily take advantage of minority shareholders (see Lins and Servaes, 2000; Lins, 2000) . If expropriation of minority shareholders increases during a crisis period, then the associated loss in firm value could be particularly pronounced for diversified firms. While diversification can also offer the benefit of improving capital allocation (Stein, 1997), particularly in emerging markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2000) , this benefit could virtually disappear in a time of crisis as investment opportunities diminish.
Corporate diversification is associated with significantly worse stock price performance during the crisis. Regressions show that, on average, diversified firms had lower returns of 7.6%
over the crisis period (after controlling for size, leverage, country, and industry). This result builds on the finding of a pre-crisis diversification discount in Asian emerging markets by Lins 6 and Servaes (2000) and by Claessens et al. (1999a) , who also find that this discount widened during the crisis. One way in which diversified firms could dissipate value during the crisis is by inefficiently supporting distressed industries with resources from relatively stable industries. To some degree, firms are not hostages to the legal regime of their home country.
The next section describes data and methodology. Section 3 reports the main results.
Section 4 presents the results of robustness tests while Section 5 analyzes alternative 7 interpretations. Section 6 reports the evidence on firm performance following the crisis. Section 7 concludes.
Data and methodology
The countries studied in this paper are Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand, which are the five countries that were most involved in the East Asian financial crisis.
Although other East Asian countries (and other emerging markets outside of Asia) were affected by the crisis, the five considered here suffered disproportionately in terms of stock market decline and currency depreciation (see Table 1 ).
All firms from these five countries are included in the sample provided that they meet three criteria. 
Variable descriptions
To measure firm performance during the crisis I use stock returns over the crisis period, from July 1997 through August 1998. The returns are dividend inclusive and are expressed in local currencies adjusted for local price index changes. I do not calculate abnormal returns using 9 historical betas because data limitations prevent the calculation of pre-crisis betas for many firms. As an alternative, I use measures of leverage and size, industry dummies, and country dummies in the regressions to control for factors that could affect expected returns. Pre-crisis betas can be calculated for about 80% of the firms if a minimal requirement of 24 monthly precrisis observations is imposed. In regressions using this subsample of 80% of the firms, beta has no significant explanatory power for returns once size, leverage, and industry are included as control variables. Table 1 shows the average return by country for the crisis period.
To measure disclosure quality I use two variables. The first is a dummy variable that is set to one if the firm had an ADR listed in the U.S. at the beginning of the crisis and zero Table 1 ).
Clearly the Because many firms from these countries are affiliated with corporate groups, the question arises as to whether firms that are reported as diversified are stand-alone firms with multiple business segments or group-affiliated firms with consolidated balance sheets reflecting the activities of a number of different firms. A review of the types of firms in the sample and their accounting practices suggests three reasons why firms that are reported as diversified should generally be interpreted as being diversified and not just group affiliated. First, in this sample, diversified firms are no more likely to be affiliated with groups (as defined by Claessens et al., 2000) than are single-segment firms. 5 Second, while most firms in the sample do report consolidated balance sheets (at least for significant subsidiaries), the percentage of firms with consolidated balance sheets is almost as high among single-segment firms (76%) as among diversified firms (81%). Third, as discussed in Section 4, despite some overlap between diversification and group affiliation, a diversification indicator has strong explanatory power for firm performance during the crisis, whereas a group-affiliation indicator has very little explanatory power.
I use other variables to control for factors that could affect firm performance. The first is firm size, measured by the logarithm of total assets. Using total assets as a measure of firm size could be problematic if different countries in the sample have varying standards for reporting the cost basis of investments on their balance sheet. Each country has some firms that use strictly historical cost basis and some firms that use some type of market revaluation. The exception is Korea, where all sample firms use historical cost. To address this potential bias, I also use net sales as an alternative size measure.
An additional control variable is the firm's debt ratio, measured as the book value of total debt divided by the book value of total capital. These data are reported by Worldscope. I include dummy variables for four of the five countries included in the regressions to control for country fixed effects. I also include dummy variables for ten of 11 industries, where industries are defined broadly, as in Campbell (1996) .
By including leverage as a control variable, I am potentially making it more difficult to detect the effects of weak governance. Specifically, weak corporate governance could have been correlated with higher debt levels prior to the crisis (see Friedman and Johnson, 2000) , so poor stock price performance attributed to leverage could also be partially caused, indirectly, by weak corporate governance. Still, leverage is included as a control variable because higher debt 13 naturally leads to lower stock returns in a downturn, although Forbes (2000) does not find strong evidence of this during the crisis.
Econometric issues
A number of econometric issues in the regression analysis need to be addressed.
Multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem in the model. With all key variables included in the model, the average variance inflation factor is 2.6 (with a maximum of 5.8), which is not unreasonably high. I correct for heteroskedasticity using robust standard errors.
I test for omitted variables using two versions of the Ramsey test, one using powers of the fitted values of the dependent variable and one using powers of the independent variables.
With all key variables included in the model, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the model has no omitted variables at the 95% confidence level using both tests. Nevertheless, even though A final econometric issue is that errors across firms may not be independent because returns are correlated in calendar time. As a diagnostic measure to address this issue, I run simulated regressions of the actual return data on a wide variety of randomly generated 15 hypothetical variables. In 10,000 repetitions, the coefficients on the hypothetical variables are significant at the 1% level 1.1% of the time, at the 5% level 5.3% of the time, and at the 10% level 10.3% of the time. The lack of spuriously significant coefficients suggests that correlation of errors is not a serious problem in the data.
Results
To assess the impact of corporate governance variables on firm stock price performance during the crisis, I estimate the following model: 
in which the corporate governance variables included change according to the specification, and the other variables are as defined previously. The results are economically significant as well. The higher returns attributed to firms with higher disclosure quality seem even larger in light of the fact that firm values declined, on average, almost 70% over the crisis period. For example, if a non-ADR firm declined 70% over the period and an ADR firm declined 59.2% (10.8% higher), then by the end of the crisis period, these firms would be valued at 30% and 40.8% of pre-crisis values respectively. This amounts to a 36% post-crisis premium for ADR firms relative to non-ADR firms when compared to their pre-crisis valuations. In other words, retaining an additional 10.8% of pre-crisis value amounts to retaining 36% of post-crisis value. This measurement is important because it reflects the valuations of investors at the bottom of the stock market decline. At this point, investors placed a very high premium on firms that had opted for higher disclosure quality.
Disclosure quality and firm performance
The disclosure quality results should be interpreted cautiously for two reasons. First, firms with ADRs and Big Six auditors could have unmodeled characteristics other than higher disclosure quality that affect their returns. These potential alternative explanations are considered in Section 5. Second, the lack of a valid instrument for these variables could leave some question about the direction of causality. Nevertheless, as noted previously, the crisis was an unanticipated event, and firms opted for ADRs and Big Six auditors before (sometimes many years before) the crisis began. And when these choices were made it doesn't appear that firms opting for higher disclosure quality would have expected to have more stable stock prices (based on past data). These results indicate that the presence of a strong blockholder was beneficial during the crisis, consistent with the hypothesis that a strong blockholder has the incentive and power to prevent expropriation of minority shareholders.
Ownership structure and firm performance
In Panel B of Table 3 that is set to one if the firm has a pyramidal ownership structure. Consistent with the idea that such structures increase the likelihood of expropriation of minority shareholders, the coefficient on this variable is negative, but it is significant only when size and leverage controls are not included.
19 Table 4 presents the results of regressions of crisis-period stock returns on diversification variables. 6 The first two columns include the diversified indicator (with and without controls for size and leverage). With all controls included, the coefficient on diversified is -0.076, which
Corporate diversification and firm performance
indicates that diversified firms, on average, had a lower return of 7.6% over the crisis period.
The coefficient on diversified is significant at the 1% level. The second two columns include diversification measured as the number of industries per firm. The coefficient on this alternative diversification measure is also negative and significant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the reduced transparency of diversified firms offers greater opportunities for expropriation of minority shareholders. Valuations declined much less for firms that had opted for a focused structure prior to the crisis.
In the final two columns of Table 4 , I distinguish between diversified firms that have high and low degrees of variation in investment opportunities across operating segments. I create a measure of the diversity of investment opportunities similar to that used in Rajan, Servaes, and
Zingales (2000). I use the market-to-book ratio of each firm as a proxy for Tobin's q to indicate the level of investment opportunity. I match each segment of each diversified firm to the industry median market-to-book ratio for single-segment firms in each industry in each country.
Industries are defined at the two-digit SIC level, but if no single-segment firms are available for a particular two-digit SIC in a particular country, I use broader industry classifications as defined in Campbell (1996) . If no match is available at all, I use the countrywide median market-to-book 6 I also calculate the diversification discount for firms in the sample using methodology similar to Berger and Ofek (1995) . Consistent with my regression results and with Claessens et al. (1999a) , I find that the diversification discount widened significantly during the crisis period. However, I do not report these results because reliable estimates of the discount require a larger number of sample firms.
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ratio as a fill-in. To measure variation in investment opportunities I take the standard deviation of the matched market-to-book ratios for all segments in the firm. Diversified firms with variations above (below) the median for all diversified firms are designated as having high (low) variation in investment opportunities. In Table 4 , I then interact this measure with the diversification indicator. The final two columns of Table 4 show that the negative coefficient on diversified firms is much stronger among those firms that have high variation in investment opportunities. This result is consistent with the idea that diversified firms lose value if segments that are relatively stable are used to inefficiently support segments that are hit particularly hard by the crisis. In Panel B of Table 5 , I change the definition of the crisis period to begin on May 1996.
Robustness checks
The motivation for this robustness check can be seen in Fig. 1 , which shows that the stock markets of Thailand and Korea were declining steadily well before July 2, 1997, a date usually considered to be the start of the crisis. Panel B shows that the results are robust to measuring returns over this longer period. Although the magnitude of some coefficients declines somewhat, all key variables retain significance. In Panel C of Table 6 , I measure returns in U.S. In other tests not reported, the results are robust to using alternative measures of firm size, including the square and cube of total assets and the log values of those measures. The results are also robust to measuring size as net sales, the square and cube of net sales, and the log values of those measures. Similarly, the results are robust to measuring the debt ratio as total debt over total sales and including a market-to-sales ratio as an explanatory variable, although in this specification the coefficient on Big Six decreases significantly in the reduced sample (with ownership variables) and increases significantly in the full sample. In an analysis of outliers, the results are robust to truncating the data at the first and 99 th percentiles of the return, size, leverage, and ownership variables. In a test of the robustness of the diversified variable, the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on diversified remain the same if I also include a dummy variable indicating group affiliation. This suggests that the diversification of operating segments drives the results on diversified firms, not their affiliation with corporate groups.
Alternative interpretations
One alternative interpretation of the results is that disclosure quality, ownership structure, and diversification are proxies for other characteristics that affect firm returns. Firm size, leverage, and industry are three possibilities that have been controlled for in the regressions, but other possibilities remain. One firm characteristic that my variables could potentially be proxies for is the degree to which firms conduct business internationally. Firms with a higher proportion of sales to foreign countries would be insulated from the crisis to the extent that sales are to countries that did not experience relative currency depreciation. To test this possibility I use a variable constructed as the percentage of a firm's foreign sales divided by total sales. I am able to test this variable only on a subset of firms, because Worldscope reports this information for only 230 of the firms in my sample. In regressions using this subsample (not reported), the 23 percentage of foreign sales has no explanatory power for returns during the crisis, whether the variable is used alone or with control variables. The lack of significance of this variable indicates that firms with a high percentage of international business are not driving the results.
In addition, disclosure quality, ownership structure, and diversification could be correlated with other variables that have been shown to be correlated with firm returns. One possibility is a firm's book-to-market ratio (Fama and French, 1992 ). This variable is available for about 95% of the firms in my sample. The book-to-market ratio is insignificant in all regressions, and is not reported. As discussed previously, a firm's beta also has no explanatory power for returns in the subset of firms for which a pre-crisis beta can be calculated (once firm size, leverage, and industry are included as control variables).
Another alternative interpretation of the results is that disclosure quality, ownership structure, and diversification always affect stock returns in these countries, and that their significance is not specific to the crisis period. If the importance of these variables during the crisis is due to an increased risk (or awareness) of expropriation of minority shareholders, then the variables should not have as great an impact in pre-crisis periods. To address this issue, I
repeat the regressions of corporate governance variables on returns for two pre-crisis years. (I do not look at earlier periods because limitations on Worldscope's historical data begin to greatly reduce the available sample of firms prior to 1995.) Panel A of Table 6 shows the results of regressions of returns from the pre-crisis period of July 1995 to June 1996. Panel B shows the results for the pre-crisis period of July 1996 to June 1997. The number of observations declines in each earlier year due to data limitations. Very few strong patterns are evident in the coefficients in Panels A and B. In some cases the sign of the coefficients is opposite of the sign during the crisis period, but in other cases the sign is the same. None of the corporate governance variables in the pre-crisis regressions is significant at standard levels. The results in 24 Panels A and B suggest that the impact of these variables during the crisis was not the continuation of effects that existed prior to the crisis. Nor does the performance of these variables during the crisis appear to be a reversal of abnormal returns prior to the crisis.
A final important alternative interpretation to consider is that firms with ADRs (or perhaps, those with Big Six auditors) perform better during the crisis because these firms have better access to capital. Lins, Strickland, and Zenner (2000) argue that access to external capital markets is an important benefit for non-U.S. firms listing their stock in the U.S. One indicator of whether firms with ADRs benefited from better access to capital is to look at how investment levels changed for firms during the crisis. As would be expected, investment levels fell for most firms during the crisis. Between the last pre-crisis year (fiscal year-ends before July 1997) and the mid-crisis year (fiscal year-ends between July 1997 and June 1998) the median drop in capital expenditures for all firms in the sample is 39.3%. The declines for firms with ADRs and without ADRs were fairly similar. The median decline in capital expenditures for firms with ADRs was 36.1%, and the median decline for firms without ADRs was 39.5%. The difference is even smaller between Big Six and non-Big Six firms. The decline in capital expenditures divided by sales was 18.0% for firms with ADRs and 20.0% for firms without ADRs. The median decline for Big Six firms was greater than for non-Big Six firms. The relatively small differences in investment declines between these groups (none of which are statistically significant) suggest that differences in access to capital were not a large factor in performance differences during the crisis. Nevertheless, greater access to capital is one alternative interpretation of the disclosure quality results that cannot entirely be ruled out.
Firm performance following the crisis
25 Panels A and B of Table 6 show that variables related to corporate governance had little explanatory power for firm returns prior to the crisis period. In Panel C of Table 6 practices. For example, in Thailand, exchange-listed firms were ordered to appoint audit subcommittees on their boards and to align disclosure practices with international standards. In Korea, the government asked chaebols to eliminate excessive diversification and concentrate on core businesses. In Indonesia, rules were changed to encourage exchange-listed firms to offer new equity to new outside shareholders (Asian Development Bank, 2000) . Whether countrywide mandates will result in effective change at the firm level remains to be seen, but investors have also taken steps to encourage improvements in governance. For example, following the crisis the California Public Employees' Retirement System drew up a set of global governance principles and has since tried to ensure that the billions of dollars it has committed to Asia are not invested in companies that lack good governance practices (Brancato, 1999) .
Conclusion
Legal protection of minority shareholders is clearly a key element of corporate governance. But legal reforms come about slowly, and some countries may never have strong and well-enforced minority shareholder rights. Are firms in such countries destined to remain vulnerable to devaluation and distress during a financial crisis? To some extent yes, perhaps, but this paper suggests that at least some power for improving minority shareholder protection lies at the firm level. Companies that offered higher disclosure quality, greater transparency, a more favorable ownership structure, and a more focused organization appear to have provided greater protection to their minority shareholders during the East Asian financial crisis. Stronger corporate governance was especially important when it should have been important-during an unexpected period of extreme economic distress when the risk of expropriation of minority shareholders was high.
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The East Asian financial crisis was a devastating event that adversely affected millions of people. For that reason alone, the crisis warrants the special attention it has received from researchers. Table 2 Crisis-period stock returns and disclosure quality
The table reports coefficients of regressions of crisis-period stock returns on disclosure quality variables for 398 East Asian firms. Stock returns are measured over the crisis period (defined as July 1997 through August 1998) in local currency terms adjusted for local price changes. Firms with missing data on total assets or debt ratios are excluded from regressions that include these variables. "ADR" means the firm had an American depository receipt listed in the U.S. at the outset of the crisis. "Big Six auditor" means the firm's auditor is one of the Big Six accounting firms. Firm size is the logarithm of total assets. The debt ratio is total debt over total capital. Country dummies are included for four of the five countries, and industry dummies are included for ten of 11 industries broadly defined as in Campbell (1996) . Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are given in brackets and asterisks denote significance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%. The table reports coefficients of regressions of crisis-period stock returns on ownership structure variables for 398 East Asian firms. Panel A focuses on basic ownership concentration measures. Panel B differentiates between managerial and nonmanagerial ownership. Panel C examines differences in cash flow and voting rights. Stock returns are measured over the crisis period (defined as July 1997 through August 1998) in local currency terms adjusted for local price changes. Firms with missing data on total assets or debt ratios are excluded from regressions that include these variables. Firm size is the logarithm of total assets. The debt ratio is total debt over total capital. Country dummies are included for four of the five countries, and industry dummies are included for ten of 11 industries broadly defined as in Campbell (1996) . Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are given in brackets and asterisks denote significance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%. Variables in Panel C are based on data supplied by Simeon Djankov. 
Panel A. Ownership concentration
(i) (ii) (iii)(iv)
